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DISCUSSIONS OF DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE
COVERAGE DURING VOIR DIRE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT
PRACTICE AND ITS ORIGINS
KEVIN S. CARPENTERt

The practice of questioning potential jurors during voir dire about
their knowledge of the defendant's insurance coverage has been utilized in Minnesota since the turn of the century. This practice has
now been

codifiedfor use by the

District Courts, but its

continued use

is questioned. In this Article, the history of this practice is tracedfrom
its origins through the present. After reviewing possiblejustifications
for its use, the Article concludes that this practiceshould be eliminated
during voir dire.
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INTRODUCTION

Every Minnesota district court judge has had to develop a
practice governing discussions of a defendant's insurance coverage during voir dire in tort cases. Modern practice is based
largely upon Rule 31 of Part I of the Code of Rules for the
District Courts, and the modern practice based upon this rule
is technically flawed and fails to address concerns raised in the
appellate cases preceding it.
Many trial court judges habitually obtain the name of defendant's insurer from defendant's counsel either in chambers
just before the start of trial or at the time of pretrial. Several
Minnesota districts now require this information as part of pretrial statements. 1 At some point during voir dire, the trial
judge typically asks the jurors, as a group, "Do any of you have
an interest in the (name of defendant's insurance company) as
policyholders, stockholders, officers, agents or otherwise?"2
The question seems to be most frequently asked either just
before the court allows juror questioning by defense counsel
or at the end of all questioning, prior to preemptory
challenges.
If no jurors respond, the inquiry ends. If one or more of the
jurors raises a hand, the response varies. Some trial judges
simply give counsel an opportunity to note which jurors responded. Other judges simply ask the responding jurors the
specific nature of their interest and then end the inquiry. Still
other trial judges ask those jurors expressing an interest in the
company if that interest might cause them to be biased in deciding the outcome of the case.
This latter inquiry makes some sense when coupled with the
1. See MINN. 4TH DIST. CT. R. 4.04(c) (1987); MINN. 10TH DIST. CT. R. 4.05(b)
(1987). The author is also aware that several judges in the Seventh District habitually
include, as part of an order scheduling a case for pre-trial, a requirement that statements of the case be filed and that those statements list names of insurance carriers
"involved" in the case.
2. If more than one insurer is disclosed, they are all named, usually in one single question. The form of the question appears to come from language contained in
Rule 31. See MINN. CODE R. DIST. CT. Part I, Rule 31 (1987).
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prefatory statement made by some judges in advance of the
actual "insurance question," "the (name of defendant's insurance company) may have an interest in the outcome of this
case." At least one district court judge tells the jury that the
insurer "does," rather than "may," have an interest. Some
trial judges, however, have asked jurors if their interest in the
insurance company would cause them to be biased, without
prefacing the question with the statement that the insurer may
have an interest in the outcome. Some jurors respond that
their interest in the company would not cause them to be biased, even though they have not been told what interest the
3
company may have in the outcome.
The "insurance question" can be raised in voir dire in a variety of ways. 4 A now deceased St. Cloud attorney once told this
author of a case he tried in Hennepin County District Court
about 25 years ago in which he represented the plaintiff. In
the process of questioning the jury, he turned to the trial judge
and asked, in front of and within the hearing of the jury:
"Your Honor, would you please have counsel for defendant
disclose the name of defendant's insurance carrier, so that I
can ask the appropriate question of the jury?" Defense counsel was furious, but the judge ruled that plaintiff's approach
was proper. The problem could have been avoided, the trial
judge said, if defendant's counsel had disclosed the name of
the insurer in chambers and requested that the court ask the
"insurance question" of the jury. 5
3. This author has seen this response occur. The author is unaware, through
personal experience or through conversation with other lawyers and district court
judges, of any judge telling the jury anything specific about the nature of the insurer's interest. Curiously, the author is also unaware of any situation where a juror
asked the court what the insurer's interest was, though the Minnesota Supreme Court
has suggested that jurors do not ask because they assume that the insurer named
insures the defendant. See Lesewski v. Neilen, 254 Minn. 286, 288, 95 N.W.2d 13, 16
(1959).
4. If the issue is not raised during voir dire by either the court or counsel, the
"insurance question" may not be asked at all. In one trial that this author participated in where the "insurance question" was not asked, after the jury had been impaneled but before opening statements, plaintiff's counsel asked the trial court to
reopen voir dire to ask the "insurance question." The trial court refused, ruling that
the plaintiff had waived the right to have the question asked. North Cent. Outdoor
Equip. Co. v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Casualty Co. and Citizens Agency, Inc., No.
41673 (Crow Wing County Dist. Ct., May, 1985). To avoid such a problem of waiver
of the insurance question, some plaintiffs' counsel have a practice of requesting prior
to trial that the trial judge ask the jury the "insurance question."
5. Interview with the late Bruce Sherwood, Esq. (March 1986).
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The same attorney also told this author that some district
court judges apparently believe that appropriate disclosure requires identifying the city where the home office of the insurer
is located, and that he learned about this the hard way. He was
defending a case and had given the name of the insurer in
chambers. Then, in court and in front of the jury, the judge
turned to the attorney and said, "What city is that insurer
from?" Irate, the defense attorney was allowed to approach
the bench, where the judge told him that the rule required disclosure of the name and location of the insurance carrier. The
judge said he felt certain that, next time, counsel would be sure
6
to provide complete disclosure in chambers.
One St. Cloud lawyer had a practice - until discontinued at
the direction of a trial judge - of drawing attention to the "insurance question," which would follow plaintiff's voir dire:
"Jurors, I don't have any more questions for you, but if you'll
turn your attention to the bench, his Honor now has one very
7
important question for you."
These variations in current practice are the reason for this
article. The only consistent practice is that jurors are never
informed of the specific nature of the insurer's interest in the
outcome. The inconsistencies indicate a need to examine the
origins of the practice and determine what conduct really is or
is not authorized with respect to the insurance question. This
article, then, will examine the aspect of trial practice which relates to discussions of defendant's insurance coverage during
voir dire, the origins of that practice, the theories upon which
it has been based, and the flaws that still plague it.
I.

ORIGINS OF CURRENT PRACTICE

-

THE COMMON LAw

The earliest reported Minnesota case on the subject is
Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co.8 During voir dire, plaintiff's counsel asked each juror whether he was connected in any manner
with a certain accident insurance company. 9 Defendant's
counsel objected to this questioning.' 0 Plaintiff's counsel was
6. Id.
7. Interview with the Honorable Paul Hoffman, Judge of Steams County District Court (August 27, 1987).
8. 89 Minn. 354, 94 N.W. 1079 (1903).

9. Id. at 358, 94 N.W. at 1081.
10. Id.
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then allowed to call one of defendant's counsel as a witness."I
Defendant's counsel admitted under oath that the company
indemnamed had issued defendant a policy of insurance for
12
defendant.
real
the
was
and
accident
of
nity in case
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled:
In order to secure to litigants unbiased and unprejudiced
jurors, we are compelled to hold that plaintiff's counsel had
a right to ascertain whether there was such a relationship
between the persons called as jurors and the insurance company, a corporation vitally interested in the result, which
by implication,
would disqualify these persons, because,
13
they would be biased and prejudiced.
The supreme court gave the following response to defendant's objections to the practice of disclosing the name of defendant's insurer and asking the jurors if any of them had a
relationship with that insurer:
Counsel contends, among other things, as a reason why
such questions should not be permitted and the real facts
shown, that, if it is brought to the knowledge of the jurors
that an insurance company is indemnifying the defendant
named, a verdict against the latter will be much more easily
found. Possibly there is ground for this assertion, but we
must assume, as a general rule, that jurors will treat all litigants fairly and impartially, will be guided by the testimony,
and that they will not be influenced by any other considera4
tion than that of justice and fair treatment to all.'
The Spoonick decision was followed in Antletz v. Smith.' 5 In
Antletz, plaintiff's counsel asked each of three jurors if "he was
6
in any way interested in an accident insurance company."'
Opposing counsel did not object. 1 7 Plaintiff's counsel, in the
presence of the jury, then asked defendant's counsel, "What is
the name of the insurance company defending this case, the
Travelers',

isn't it?"8

Defendant's

counsel

objected

and

stated, "I wish it on record that I do not know whether they are
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 359, 94 N.W. at 1081.
14. Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.

97 Minn. 217, 106 N.W. 517 (1906).
Id. at 220, 106 N.W. at 518.
Id.
Id.
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insured or not."19 The trial court allowed plaintiff's counsel to
inquire whether or not the jurors had an interest in any insurance company. 20 Referring to the dialogue about defendant's
insurance, the supreme court noted that "the only question is
whether the appellant was prejudiced by the mere discussion
of the subject-matter in the presence of thejury." 2 Defendant
claimed that the discussion in the presence of the jurors deprived him of a fair trial. The supreme court disagreed, relying
upon and quoting at length from its opinion in Spoonick. The
court again held that plaintiff's counsel had a right to determine whether or not prospective jurors had a relationship with
defendant's insurer because such persons "by implication ...
22
would be biased and prejudiced."
Interestingly, the supreme court in Antletz said, " [T]he right
under some circumstances to call the defendant's attorney and
interrogate him with reference to indemnity insurance was recognized in Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co." 23 This is a stark contrast to the supreme court's admonition in other cases that
attorneys expecting to be called upon as witnesses in a particular case should refrain from appearing as counsel in that
case.

24

In Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co. ,25 the discussion of defendant's insurance occurred during trial. After the jurors
were seated, plaintiff's counsel asked defendant's counsel
"whether it would be admitted that there was liability insurance in this case." 2 6 Defendant's counsel replied that it would
not. 2 7 Plaintiff's attorney then called and questioned a witness
who testified, over the defendant's objection, that he was an
agent of a local company that worked for different accident in19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id
22. Id. at 221, 106 N.W. at 518, quoting Spoonick, 89 Minn. at 359, 94 N.W. at

1081.
23. Id. at 220, 106 N.W. at 518.
24. SeeIn re Meehan's Estate, 220 Minn. 1, 7, 18 N.W.2d 781, 784 (1945): "It is
true, we have held that an attorney who expects to be called upon as a witness should
refrain from appearing as counsel in the litigation, and we again stress our admonition to attorneys in this respect." See also Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (disapproving an attorney representing a client at trial in a situation
where the attorney knew that his partners would be called as witnesses).
25. 99 Minn. 97, 108 N.W. 891 (1906).
26. Id. at 108, 108 N.W. at 895.
27. Id.
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surance companies and had been directed by that local company "to come up here [presumably where trial was being
held], interview the witnesses, and see that they attended
court." 28 Plaintiff's counsel then asked a juror "whether he

was in any way interested as a stockholder in that accident
company - 'the company insuring the defendant in this
case.' "29 At that point in the trial, it had not been established
that the named company actually insured defendant, and an
objection on the ground that 0counsel's statement assumed
facts not proven was sustained.3
Counsel for the plaintiff referred to a request that had been
served upon defense counsel, seeking production of defendant's insurance policy. 3 ' The court, however, noted that the
request had not been served upon defendant's counsel, but
at trial.
rather it had been served upon counsel not appearing
32
The court ruled that this request proved nothing.
Plaintiff's counsel then asked defendant's counsel if any officers or members of "the defendant company" were present.
Defense counsel replied that none were present, and none
were expected until later in the hearing. 33 Plaintiff's counsel
then requested that the officers bring the policy when they
came to court, to which defense counsel replied that he had
not communicated with the defendant yet. 34 Plaintiff's counsel

then examined the jurors for cause, apparently without further
35
reference to defendant's insurance.
On appeal, defendant moved for relief on the ground that
plaintiff's interrogation of the witness "was not sought in good
faith nor for the purpose of the action, but simply and alone
for the purpose of calling to the attention of the jury that it was
probable that the defendant was protected against any judgment which might be secured against it in the form of insur28. Id. at 108, 108 N.W. at 896. As described, the witness's role seems much like
that of a modern insurance claims adjuster. See id., at 108, 108 N.W. at 895-96.

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 108-09, 108 N.W. at 896.

33. Id.
34. Id. It appears that the defense counsel was referring, in the latter statement,
to the insurer. Also it is not clear from the appellate opinion whether or not this last
exchange occurred in the jury's presence.

35. Id.
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ance .... "36 The supreme court noted that because of the
manner in which the motion for new trial had been framed by
defendant, the only issue before them was whether or not the
questions put to the witness were in good faith. 37 The
supreme court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in ruling that the usual measure of good faith was
38
present.
Although exactly what happened before the trial court in
Viou is unclear, and although the supreme court chose not to
directly address the discussions of defendant's insurance, the
court nevertheless addressed, at some length, the subject of
defendant's insurance and voir dire. The discussion begins
with the comment that relevant authorities revealed that:
[a] definite recession from the original position that the
connection of an indemnity insurance company is entirely
collateral to the issues in an action to recover for personal
injuries, and that such cases should be managed from the
bench with a most scrupulous and constant regard to the
suppression of the reprehensible practice of introducing
such a distracting consideration, and that it would be prejudicial and reversible error to cause that interest of the insur39
ance company to appear in course of the trial.
The supreme court, itself, then proceeded to recede from that
"original position."
The court also noted that other courts "generally recognized
that the insurance company, being to a certain extent at least,
the real party defendant in interest, cannot invariably conceal
that interest." 40 One reaction to this statement is that nearly
every plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury case proceeds on
a contingent fee basis. Therefore, the plaintiff's attorney is, to
a certain extent at least, a real party in interest. 4 1 Yet that fact
is invariably concealed from the jury.
The one principle quite firmly stated in Viou is that:
in order to secure to litigants unbiased and unprejudiced
jurors . . . plaintiff's counsel ha[ve] a right to ascertain
whether there [i]s such a relationship between the persons
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 105, 108 N.W. at 894 (citations omitted).

40. Id.
41. Id.
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called as jurors and the insurance company, a corporation
vitally interested in the result, which would disqualify
by implication they would be bith[o]se persons because
42
ased and prejudiced.
In Viou, the court does not instruct how to properly go about
the inquiry, but it suggests:
Where, as in this case, counsel for defendant have been
served with notice to produce the policy of indemnity, they
are fully advised in the premises and can quietly bring the
matter before the court in the presence of counsel for plainof the jurors sitting in
tiff so as not to call it to the attention
43
the box or in the courtroom.
It also should be noted that everyone involved in the Viou case,
including defendant's counsel, referred to the insurance company as "the defendant company." 4 4 This practice is not followed today unless, for some reason, an insurer is a named
defendant.
Spoonick, Antletz, and Viou were cited with approval in Granrus
v. Croxton Mining Co. 45 As in Spoonick, the Granrus opinion reflects that plaintiff's counsel was allowed to call defendant's
counsel as a witness, over the latter's objection. Plaintiff's
counsel thereby established that defense counsel was employed by an insurance company to defend the action. The
46
supreme court found no error in this procedure.
The supreme court seemed to back down somewhat from
this position in Gracz v. Anderson. 4 7 Defendant had been called
as a witness on his own behalf.48 Plaintiff's counsel tried to
show, on cross-examination, the extent of the defendant's financial interest in the case. 49 The exact extent of the questioning is not clear from the appellate opinion, but the supreme
court noted that the trial court prevented plaintiff's counsel
from continuing the subject. 50 The court inferred from plaintiff's brief and oral argument that the intent of the questioning
was to establish that defendant carried indemnity insurance
42. Id. at 105-06, 108 N.W. at 894 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 107-08, 108 N.W. at 895.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See generally id. at 109, 108 N.W. at 896.
102 Minn. 325, 113 N.W. 693 (1907).
Id. at 329, 113 N.W. at 694.
104 Minn. 476, 116 N.W. 1116 (1908).
Id. at 478, 116 N.W. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
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and to show the extent to which the policy protected defendant
in case of a recovery from plaintiff.5'
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's rulings and discussed the insurance issue in somewhat contradictory
language:
Defendant in the case at bar, as a party to the action, was as
a matter of course interested in the result, and it is a little
difficult to understand just how his protective insurance, or
the extent thereof, would affect his credibility as a witness.
But, that aside, the question of indemnity insurance was wholly and
entirely collateral to the issues made by the pleadings, and the fact, if
brought out, would have tended only to prejudice the minds of thejury
in favor of plaintiff's recovery. It has been held that the fact of
insurance in cases of this kind is proper to be shown at the
opening of the trial to enable the parties intelligently to select the jury. [citing Spoonick and Antletz]. But it certainly
cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to exclude the matter when first suggested during
trial, when the only real or substantialeffect can be to prejudice unconsciously the minds of the jury; and we therefore hold that the
discretion vested in the trial court on this subject fully justified the restriction of the cross-examination and52the exlusion of the fact sought to be developed thereby.
The supreme court distinguished Gracz from its other decisions regarding insurance and voir dire in Heydman v. Red Wing
Brick Co. 5 3 In Heydman, counsel for plaintiff asked defendant's

counsel during voir dire, to state whether they represented
"the real defendant or an insurance company, and, if an insurance company is defending, the name of it." 5 4 The trial court

refused to require defense counsel to answer. 55 Defense counsel stated that they had no objection to "any juror being asked
56
whether he had any interest in any insurance company."
Plaintiff's counsel once again requested the name of the specific company that insured defendant, but defendant's objection that the request assumed a fact not shown and tended to
57
prejudice the issues was sustained.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 479, 116 N.W. at 1118 (emphasis added).
112 Minn. 158, 127 N.W. 561 (1910).
Id. at 163, 127 N.W. at 562.
Id.

56. Id.
57. Id.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss1/2
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On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that, when
impaneling the jury, the plaintiff has a right to know the name
of the specific company, if any, insuring the defendant in order
to properly determine if a prospective juror should be challenged. 58 The court distinguished Gracz as governing the
questioning of a witness during trial for the purpose of testing
credibility, rather than the questioning of prospective jurors
during voir dire. 59 The court did not address its statements in
Gracz indicating that the question of the defendant's insurance
is collateral to the issues made by the pleadings and, if brought
out, tends to only prejudice the minds of the jury in favor of
the plaintiff's recovery.
In Uggen v. Bazille & Partridge,60 there was a full discussion of
the fact that defendant was insured, as well as an inquiry into
the prospective jurors' relationships with the insurer or its local agent. 6 1 Defendant excepted to a statement that the local
agent was the "real party in interest." 62 Defense counsel apparently called himself to the stand and testified that, though he
had been retained by the insurer or its local agent as their attorney, he was paid by the defendant. 63 Plaintiff's counsel
withdrew the question referring to the local agent as the "real
party in interest," and he admitted that the local agent's interest was as shown by the testimony of defendant's counsel. 64
Defense counsel's motion to discharge the panel because of error was denied. 65 The supreme court affirmed this decision,
finding "no basis for an imputation of bad faith on the part of
plaintiff's counsel." 66
Viita v. Flemming67 also dealt with the issue of whether or not
an attorney can mention, in the presence of the jury, the fact
that the defendant has insurance. In Viita, defendant's counsel
admitted the name of the insurer in the presence of the jury. 68
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
127 Minn. 364, 149 N.W. 459 (1914).
Id. at 368, 149 N.W. at 461.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
132 Minn. 128, 155 N.W. 1077 (1916) (reported as Viita v. Dolan in

NORTH-

WESTERN REPORTER).

68. See id. at 137, 155 N.W. at 1081.
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Plaintiff's counsel then called defendant to the stand during
voir dire, and asked, " 'And is it true, what counsel has just
testified to, namely, that a certain company is interested in the
defense of this case?' "69 Defendant's objection was overruled,
and the supreme court affirmed, stating:
We are unable to see any chance that defendant was
prejudiced by the ruling, as the fact that defendant was insured was admitted. But we wish to express our emphatic
disapproval of the conduct of plaintiff's counsel in calling
the witness and asking this question after counsel for defendant had admitted the fact. An answer to the question
could add nothing, and could serve no legitimate
70
purpose.
A significantly different fact situation was presented in Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. ,7 where the defendant brought a counterclaim. Plaintiff's counsel told
defendant's counsel, outside the hearing of the jury, that plaintiff had no insurance. 72 Without proof, defendant's counsel remarked that he had information to the contrary. 73 He then
asked each juror if they were acquainted with the Fred L. Gray
Insurance Company, the London Guaranty and Accident Company, or the Massachusetts Bonding Company.7 4 Plaintiff's
objection was overruled, and the supreme court affirmed,
reasoning:
The questions asked the jurors did not intimate, at least did
not directly intimate, that plaintiff was protected by insurance, and we think it was within the discretion of the trial
court to permit them for the purpose of disclosing whether
the relations between the jurors and the officials of companies insuring against liability upon similar claims, were such
that the jurors might be biased against permitting the en75
forcement of such claims.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Hallam wrote:
The record does not show that plaintiff had any liability insurance at all, yet the questions asked of every juror assumed that it had. The apparent purpose of the line of
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
134 Minn. 378, 159 N.W. 832 (1916).
See id. at 379, 159 N.W. at 832.
Id.
Id. at 379-80, 159 N.W. at 832.
Id. at 380-81, 159 N.W. at 833.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss1/2

12

Carpenter: Discussions of Defendant's Insurance Coverage during Voir Dire: A

1988]

INSURANCE COVERAGE

questions asked was to create in the minds of the jurors an
impression that plaintiff would be reimbursed by insurance
for any damages it might be required to pay. I can conceive
of no other purpose.
This line of examination should not
76
have been allowed.
In another case involving the insurance question during voir
dire, Carlson v. Bernier,77 the Minnesota Supreme Court simply
said that "[t]here was no reversible error committed by the inquiry made while impaneling the jury as to whether any of the
78
jurors were interested in a certain insurance company."
In Storhaugen v. Motor Truck Service Co. ,79 the supreme court
allowed plaintiff's counsel's statement that the defendant was
insured. Just before beginning voir dire, plaintiff's counsel
asked defendant's counsel if the defendant was insured against
the claimed loss and, if so, the name of the carrier. 80 After
defendant's counsel answered the question, plaintiff's counsel
turned to the jury and proclaimed, "'It is an admitted fact...
that the Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corporation, Limited, insures the defendant.' "81 Defendant's counsel took exception
and contended that his disclosure to plaintiff's counsel had
been made out of the hearing of the jury to avoid plaintiff's
counsel having to lay a foundation for interrogation of the jurors with regard to their interest in the insurance company. 82
Since such foundation was unnecessary, the defendant argued
that the statement made to the jury by plaintiff's counsel was
not one of the issues of the case and was highly prejudicial.83
The supreme court affirmed the trial court, holding that the
statement made by plaintiff's counsel, even though it should
be held improper, does not call for a new trial if found to have
been made in good faith. 84 The court noted:
Counsel for defendant sought the supposed advantage for
his client resulting from the procedure suggested in the Viou
case, namely to keep from the jury the fact that defendant
was insured. It is thought that a jury is inclined to find a
76. Id. at 381, 159 N.W. at 833 (Hallam, J., dissenting).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

169 Minn. 517, 211 N.W. 683 (1927).
Id. at 518, 211 N.W. at 683.
171 Minn. 47, 213 N.W. 372 (1927).
Id. at 50, 213 N.W. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 50-51, 213 N.W. at 374.
Id. at 51, 213 N.W. at 374.
Id.
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verdict upon less evidence and in a more generous amount
if an insurance company rather than the wrongdoer has to
85
pay it.

In addition, the court concluded:
[I]t is difficult to find anything which may be held prejudicial in the statement[,] [because] defendant is in precisely
the same position as if the information it voluntarily gave
had been elicited by calling its counsel to the witness stand
and in the hearing of the jury asking if it carried insurance
and name of the insurer. Again, assuming that the suggestion in the Viou case had been literally followed and questions had been put to prospective jurors as to their interest
in the Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corporation, Limited,
would not every juror of average intelligence infer that such
corporation was an insurer and interested in the verdict to
86
be rendered?
The foregoing assumes that it would be appropriate to call
counsel for defendant to the witness stand and ask in the hearing of the jury whether or not the defendant carried insurance
and, if so, the name of the insurer. Would a modern court find
such an inquiry relevant to a tort case?
Curiously, the court in Storhaugen stated:
As a practical question it is submitted that justice and fair
dealing would not suffer by a candid disclosure to the jury
as to who are the real parties to the litigation, who is the
real defendant or the one who must pay if a verdict is for the
plaintiff. . . .In fact, the parties would be entitled to an
instruction that in determining who is entitled to a verdict
the issues should be treated exactly as ifthere was no insurance, nor
should the recovery, if any, be lessened or increased one
87
penny because of insurance.
If we really want ajury to decide issues as though there were no
insurance, why tell them it exists?
The court, in Storhaugen, also stated that there "may be cases
of downright collusion between a plaintiff and a defendant to
mulct the latter's insurer.- 88 The court implied that the jury
should know that the defendant has insurance because of the
possibility of this collusion, though there was no indication
that such collusion was suspected in Storhaugen.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 51-52, 213 N.W. at 374.
Id. at 52, 213 N.W. at 374 (emphasis added).
Id. at 52, 213 N.W. at 375.
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In Scholte v. Brabec,89 the supreme court allowed the plaintiff
to address the insuance question to both the jurors during voir
dire and the witnesses during trial. In Scholte, defendant's
counsel gave plaintiff's counsel the name of the insurer
outside the jury's presence.9 0 Plaintiff's counsel then asked
the jurors if any of them had an interest in that insurance company.9 1 Later, on cross-examination of two of defendant's
medical experts, plaintiff's counsel asked them if they were
members or policyholders of, or stockholders in the named insurance company.9 2 Plaintiff's counsel did not at any time
state that the named company insured the defendant.9 3 The
supreme court ruled that such questions of witnesses were permissible as it summarized the issue in the following
commentary:
It is ordinarily futile to take up the time of the court to ask
each individual juror in one of our country districts whether
he is interested in a foreign liability insurance company. If
inquiry is to be made, the better practice would seem to be
to ask one general question to all the jurors, without suggesting in any way that the matter of insurance has any
bearing on any of the issues to be tried. But it is a matter
for the discretion of the trial court. Where it is admitted
that an insurance company is interested and carries insurance, proper inquiry as to the interest or membership of
witnesses in the insurance company is permissible. The record here does not show misconduct or error in that
94
regard.
This type of question was also upheld in Martin v. Schiska.9 5
In Martin, defendant sought a new trial based in part on the
misconduct of plaintiff's attorney in inquiring about the defendant's liability insurer. In rejecting this error, the supreme
court noted that "every person of sufficient experience and intelligence to be a fit juror" knows that most automobile owners
of financial responsibility carry liability insurance. 9 6 The court
stated:
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

177 Minn. 13, 224 N.W. 259 (1929).
Id. at 16, 224 N.W. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
183 Minn. 256, 264, 236 N.W. 312, 315 (1931).
Id. at 264, 236 N.W. at 315.
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It is hardly worth while to let the jury during the trial of
such a case speculate on whether or not the defendant is
insured. What juror in these days, when he hears an attorney in the case inquire of prospective jurors whether he is
interested as a stockholder or otherwise in a named insurance company, but knows that that company has insured
the
97
owner of the automobile involved against liability.
Though collusion between plaintiff and defendant was not
alleged in Martin, the supreme court contemplated cases where
the defendant owner has an interest in the plaintiff's success.
The court stated that "[w]hen such is a defendant's attitude,
ought the jury to remain ignorant of the fact during his testimony that an insurance company and not he, the witness, will
98
have to pay the verdict?"
In declining to grant a new trial, the court concluded that
there is no attorney misconduct "[w]here it is apparent that the
jury's information regarding the existence of insurance is not
made use of to inflame or prejudice the jury." 99
The practice of asking one question about a specific insurance company of the jury as a whole, rather than asking each
juror individually, first suggested as appropriate in Scholte, was
reiterated as desirable in Prescott v. Swanson.' 0 0

The Prescott

court relied on a Michigan case, Holman v. Cole, l 0 t which held
that the practice of questioning each juror individually was to
impress upon the jurors' that the defendant was protected by
insurance and would not be personally liable for any judgment
entered in the case.' 0 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed
with the Michigan court's conclusion that this practice would
not be tolerated and that an attorney must question the jurors
collectively regarding any interest in the defendant's insurance
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court also noted that after the defendant's witness testified to owning
a half-interest in the car, the defendant was required to disclose that she had applied
for liability insurance as sole owner of the car. Id.
100. 197 Minn. 325, 338, 267 N.W. 251, 258 (1936) (citing Holman v. Cole, 242
Mich. 402, 406-07, 218 N.W. 795, 797 (1928))(the purpose of asking each juror individually, as opposed to collectively, of any interest as a stockholder in the insurance
company was not for the purpose of obtaining information but rather to impress
upon the jurors' minds that the defendant was insured and would not be personally
liable for any judgment entered in the case).
101. 242 Mich. 402, 218 N.W. 795 (1928).
102. 197 Minn. at 338, 267 N.W. at 258 (quoting 242 Mich. at 406-07, 218 N.W. at
797).
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company. 1
The Prescott court's opinion dealing with collectively questioning the jurors apparently resulted in some confusion. In
Santee v. Haggart Construction Co.,1 0 4 counsel for plaintiffs was
permitted to ask the jurors collectively if they had any interest
in the defendant's insurance company. Defendant claimed that
the jurors should have been first asked a general inquiry "as to
interest in any corporation, followed by a questioning ofjurors
answering in the affirmative as to the kind of corporation in
which they had an interest." 1 05 The Minnesota Supreme Court
admitted that it had approved such a procedure in Prescott.'0 6
It backed down from that prior approval, however, stating:
While trial judges might well require counsel to follow this
method of procedure, it was our purpose only to make a
suggestion, and not lay down an ironclad rule. We certainly
had no intention of implying that prejudicial or reversible
error would necessarily result if the inquiry were permitted
to follow some other course. The same procedure here
complained of was followed and held not to constitute error
10 7
in Scholte v. Brabec.
In approving the approach followed by the trial court, the
supreme court noted that there was "no evidence of bad faith
of following the course of inquiry adopted by counsel. If the
matter of insurance was unduly stressed before the jury it is
attributable to the objections and arguments made by defense
08
counsel at the time."'
In Rom v. Calhoun,'0 9 the court held that statements by defense counsel in the presence of the jury were prejudicial.
Before trial, defendants' counsel told the court in chambers
that defendants' insurance company had denied liability. 110
Defendants' counsel, therefore, objected to plaintiff's counsel
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
202 Minn. 361, 278 N.W. 520 (1938).
Id. at 363, 278 N.W. at 521.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).

108. Id. at 363-64, 278 N.W. at 521. Santee was cited with approval in McKeown v.
Argetsinger, 202 Minn. 595, 604, 279 N.W. 402, 407 (1938).
109. 227 Minn. 143, 34 N.W.2d 359 (1948). Rule 31 was adopted prior to the
supreme court decision. See id. at 143, 34 N.W.2d at 359; MINN. CODE R. DIST. CT.
Part I, Rule 31 (1987). However, the supreme court's decision was made without
regard to the Rule because the district court's decision and the appeal were both
made prior to the adoption of the Rule. See Record at 7, 81.
11.0. Id. at 146, 34 N.W.2d at 361.
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questioning the jurors about their interest in the company, but
counsel would not state that the insurance company was not
interested in the case."' The trial judge decided to permit
plaintiff's counsel to question the jurors generally as to any
interest in the insurance company. ' 2 Plaintiff's counsel asked
the jurors collectively if any of them had "business connections" with the insurer. ' 3 Despite the judge's decision in
chambers, defendants' counsel objected to this question by
making a speech in the presence of the jury, indicating that
defendants were not insured. ' 14 Although the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial made after a jury verdict
for defendants, the supreme court reversed, holding that defense counsel's actions constituted misconduct.'5 The
supreme court noted that the trial court had determined in
chambers, out of the presence of the jury and in conference
with counsel how far plaintiff could go in questioning the jury.
Therefore, the supreme court concluded:
That should have ended the matter. There was no justification for imputing to plaintiff's counsel any impropriety or
unfair tactics in following the trial court's decision on the
matter. Improper statements of counsel to the jury such as
we have here might well be sufficient to turn the jury in de16
fendants' favor in a case close on the facts, as this one is."
Although the supreme court's decision was based on defense
counsel's misconduct, the court did not address the rationale
behind allowing plaintiff's counsel to question thejurors about
any "business connections" with a specific insurer.
These cases are the origins of modern practice of asking the
jury the insurance question during voir dire. Together they
111.
112.

Id. at 146-47, 34 N.W.2d at 361.
Id. at 147, 34 N.W.2d at 361.

113. Id.
114.

Id. at 147, 34 N.W.2d at 362.

Defense counsel stated:

May it please the court, I object to this procedure that on the ground of the
state of the record that was made in chambers in the absence of the jury
such a question is not justified and is made for the purpose of prejudicing
the jury in this case. Particularly on behalf of defendant Strowbridge counsel has been advised that there is no insurance with respect to him, and with
respect to the defendant Calhoun that though he carried an insurance policy
with this company, the company has denied liability because of his violation
of the terms of the policy. Counsel has been advised of that, and we object
to such proceeding, to ask questions relating to it with reference to this case.
Id.
115. Id. at 148, 34 N.W.2d at 362.
116. Id. at 147-48, 34 N.W.2d at 362.
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demonstrate the inconsistencies that existed in common law
practice and raise concerns about that practice.
II.

COMPARISON OF THE STATED LEGITIMATE FUNCTION OF

THE "INSURANCE QUESTION" AND ITS
ACKNOWLEDGED PREJUDICIAL EFFECT

These inconsistencies in the practice may have been, in part,
due to the failure of the court to compare the legitimate purpose of the insurance question to the prejudice it causes. The
supreme court noted in Viou that the "original position" of relevant authorities on the subject was that "the connection of an
indemnity insurance company is entirely collateral to the issues
in an action to recover for personal injuries" and that "it
would be prejudicial and reversible error to cause that interest
7
of the insurance company to appear in course of the trial.""
Subsequently, in Gracz, the court condemned the practice of
questioning a defendant during trial about the existence of any
liabilty insurance.' 8 Although it acknowledged that such a
practice during trial would have tended only to prejudice the
minds of the jury in favor of plaintiff's recovery, the court
noted that it was appropriate to ask the same question during
voir dire "to enable the parties intelligently to select the
jury.""19
The court gave no explanation in Gracz as to why the inquiry
is thought to prejudice the minds of the jury only during trial,
and not during voir dire. The supreme court has never made
any attempt to compare the alleged legitimate purpose of the
inquiry, which is to enable parties to intelligently select a jury,
with its acknowledged harmful effect of prejudicing the minds
of the jury in favor of a plaintiff's recovery.
The alleged legitimate purpose of the inquiry about insurance during voir dire is to determine whether a prospective
juror would be biased because of a relationship with defendant's insurer - as a policyholder, shareholder, officer, agent,
or employee. The threshold inquiry, however, is whether or
not the juror even knows that the insurer with whom he or she
has the relationship, whatever it may be, has an interest in the
117. 99 Minn. at 105, 108 N.W. at 894.
118. 104 Minn. at478-79, 116 N.W. at 1117-18.
119. Id. at 479, 116 N.W. at 1118.
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outcome of the case. This issue has never been addressed by
the appellate courts.
III.

THE ATrEMPTED CODIFICATION OF COMMON LAW

RULE

A.

-

31

Rule 31

In an apparent effort to codify the common law and establish
a uniform practice applicable to discussions of defendant's insurance during voir dire, the Minnesota District Court Judges
adopted Part I of Rule 31 of the Minnesota Code of Rules.
Adopted in June 1948, and amended in June 1954, Rule 31
provides:
CIVIL JURY CASES IN WHICH INSURANCE COMPANY
INTERESTED IN DEFENSE OR OUTCOME OF ACTION
-

EXAMINATION OF JURORS

In all civil jury cases, in which an insurance company or
companies are not parties, but are interested in the defense
or outcome of the action, counsel for such company or companies may, and upon request of the presiding Judge shall,
disclose the name of such company or companies to opposing counsel, out of the hearing of the jury, as well as the
name of the local agent of such companies. When so disclosed, no inquiry shall be permitted by counsel as to such
names in the hearing of the jury, nor shall disclosure be
made to the jury that such insurance company is interested
in the action.
In the examination of the jurors by counsel as to their
qualifications, the jurors may be asked collectively whether
any of them have any interest as policyholders, stockholders, officers, agents or otherwise in the insurance company
or companies interested, but such question shall not be repeated to each individual juror. If none of the jurors indicate any such interest in the company or companies
involved, then no further inquiry shall be permitted with
reference thereto.
If any of the jurors manifest an interest in any of the companies involved, then counsel may further inquire of such
juror or jurors as to his or their interest in such company,
including any relationship or connection with the local
agent of such interested company, to determine whether
such interest or relationship disqualifies such juror.
The presiding Judge, in his discretion, may examine the
jurors on this feature of the case and not permit counsel to
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss1/2
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do so. 120
Case law preceding the adoption of the Rule usually referred
to counsel retained by the insurer for the defendant as counsel
for that insurer, rather than counsel for the defendant.' 2' The
technical flaw in the Rule is that it calls for "counsel for such
company"' 2 2 to disclose the name of the insurance company
and its local agent to the presiding judge. However, in modern practice, "counsel for such company" is not present in the
typical personal injury case. Counsel for the defendant may
have been retained by the defendant's insurer, but that retention was for the purpose of representing the insured, not the
insurer, in the tort action. 2 3 Thus, defense counsel, even
though hired by the insurance company, is counsel for the de124
fendant, not counsel for such company.
Trial court judges may overlook this technical flaw if they
determine that justice requires it. Unlike the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure, which are used by district courts but
promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Minnesota
Code of Rules is adopted by the district court judges themselves. Section 484.33 of Minnesota Statutes specifically authorizes the district courts to relax or modify these rules in the
furtherance of justice. 12 5 Also, several Minnesota Supreme
Court cases affirm trial court deviations from provisions of the
Code of Rules; however, none of these cases are recent, and
none involve an interpretation of Rule 31.126
120. MINN. CODE R. DIST. CT.Part I, Rule 31 (1987).
121. See, e.g., Viou, 99 Minn. at 109, 108 N.W. at 896. In Viou, the opinion refers to
the insurance company as "the defendant company" although the insured, BrooksScanlon Lumber Company, was the actual defendant. Id.
122. MINN. CODE R. DIST. CT. Part I, Rule 31. "Company" meaning an insurance
company which is not a party but which is "interested in the defense or outcome of
the action."Id.
123. Typically the insurer will have an interest in the outcome of the case because
of its duties to indemnify and provide a defense. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
noted that the duties to defend and indemnify are separate and distinct. See, e.g.,
Nordby v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. 1983).
124. See, e.g., Crum v. Anchor Casualty Co., 264 Minn. 378, 392, 119 N.W.2d 703,
712 (1963) (attorney retained by an insurer to defend its insured is under the same
obligations of fidelity and good faith as if the insured had retained the attorney personally); Newcomb v. Meiss, 263 Minn. 315, 322, 116 N.W.2d 593, 598 (1962) (counsel undertaking to represent an insurance policyholder owes the same "undeviating
and single allegiance" that he would owe to the insured if retained and paid by him).
125. MINN. STAT. § 484.33 (1986).
126. See Gillette-Herzog Mfg. Co. v. Ashton, 55 Minn. 75, 77, 56 N.W. 576, 576
(1893) (affirming the trial court's discretionary suspension of the Rules of the District
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If the trial court judge decides that justice requires overlooking the technical flaw in the rule, Rule 31 provides that when
disclosure is made out of the hearing of the jury, "no inquiry
shall be permitted by counsel as to such names in the hearing
of the jury ....
,27 By implication, absent such disclosure,
counsel will be permitted to inquire as to such names.
Rule 31 also states that if any juror responds affirmatively to
the insurance question, "counsel may further inquire of such
juror or jurors as to his or their interest in such company, including any relationship or connection with the local agent of
such interested company, to determine whether such interest or rela-

tionship disqualifies such juror."'128 This contemplates more than
merely asking jurors whether or not the fact that they are policyholders of the named company will cause them to be biased.
The Rule implies the right to tell the jury the nature of the insurer's interest, though no court currently allows that practice.
B.

Interpretationsof Rule 31

In 1951, the Minnesota Supreme Court referred to an inquiry about insurance during voir dire in Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Danberry. 129 The supreme court said that it was
apparent from the record that the Western Casualty and
Surety Company was interested in the case to some extent at
least.1 30 A stipulation between the insurer and a car owner involved in the case provided that the insurer would defend the
action on the part of the defendant.' 3 ' This was clearly a "reservation of rights" situation, in which the insurer agreed to defend but not necessarily indemnify; the duty to indemnify
Court of Hennepin County in issuing an order to set aside a default judgment); Nye
v. Swan, 42 Minn. 243, 245, 44 N.W. 9, 10 (1889) (affirming an order vacating a

default judgment where the affidavit of merit filed in support of the motion to vacate
the default judgment did not comply with a rule of the district court); Gale v. Seifert,
39 Minn. 171, 172, 39 N.W. 69, 69 (1888) (affirming a district court's discharge of a
writ of attachment upon the filing of a bond, though the bond did not bear a certificate acknowledging itself by the sureties as required by Rule 4 of the District Court).
127. MINN. CODE R. DisT. CT. Part I, Rule 31 (1987).
128. Id. (emphasis added). Rule 31 also expressly provides that "[t]he presiding
Judge, in his discretion, may examine the jurors on this feature of the case and not
permit counsel to do so." Id.
129. 234 Minn. 391, 401-02, 48 N.W.2d 567, 573 (1951).
130. Id. at 401, 48 N.W.2d at 573.
131. Id. at 402, 48 N.W.2d at 573.
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would be decided, if necessary, in a subsequent action between
the insurer and the insured.
The supreme court found no reversible error in the manner
in which the trial court handled the inquiry of the jury with
reference to the insurer, noting, "The court made it clear that
the company might or might not have an interest in the outcome of the case and merely asked the jury panel whether any
of them had stock in this particular company."' 3 2 Although
this case was decided after the adoption of Rule 31, the
supreme court did not make any reference to the rule in its
opinion.
In the first case to actually address Rule 31, Lesewski v. Nielsen, 13 3 the supreme cdurt noted that the trial judge had asked
the following of the prospective jurors, collectively:
"[T]he court has been advised that a certain company
known as the National Indemnity Company of Omaha, an
insurance company, may be interested in the result of this
action. If it happens that any one of you are connected with
this company either as agents or employees, or if any member of your immediate family is connected with that company in any way either as agents or employees, will you
indicate by holding up your hand."
"Are any of you policyholders in that company? Have
any policy of insurance as far as you know? I will ask you if
any of you are agents or employees of any insurance company of any kind? The record may show that there was no
' 34
response from the jury upon interrogation by the court."'
The supreme court, in commenting on this approach, noted:
While the words used by the trial court in the instant case
may not have represented the best choice, we realize that
some latitude must be permitted the courts in such matters.
In our opinion a better practice would be to ask whether a
prospective juror has any interest as policyholder, stockholder, officer, or otherwise in the company or companies
involved. However, it is our opinion that the questions in
the instant case could not be considered prejudicial error
on the basis of Martin v. Schiska, wherein it was recognized
by this court that when a prospective juror hears inquiry as
to interest in a named insurance company he knows that the
132. Id.
133. 254 Minn. 286, 95 N.W.2d 13 (1959).
134. Id. at 288, 95 N.W.2d at 15.
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named company has insured the owner of the automobile
13 5
involved against liability.
The supreme court concluded that since the record did not
reflect that the information regarding the existence of insurance had been used to inflame or prejudice the jury, the state36
ment did not constitute prejudicial error.
In Collins v. Bridgland,137 the trial court, following the "accepted practice," asked prospective jurors:
"Do either of you or any of you, so far as you know, have an
interest in the State Farm Mutual Insurance Company,
either as stockholders, well, not stockholders as this is a mutual company, but as officers, agents, directors, policyhold38
ers, or employees?" 1
One of the prospective jurors did not respond to the question,
even though her husband was both a State Farm policyholder
as well as the landlord of some property leased to a State Farm
agent, and the juror herself was a co-signer on the mortgage
on that building.1 39 After the trial, plaintiff requested that the
trial court conduct a hearing as to the propriety of that juror
having served on the case, but the request was denied. 40 On
appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed without making any reference whatsoever to Rule 3 1.
In Rosenthal v. Kolars,14 1 plaintiff's counsel in a medical malpractice action collectively asked the panel of prospective jurors during voir dire if they or any close relatives or
acquaintances had ever been employed as a claims adjuster for
a company that wrote medical malpractice insurance.' 4 2 The
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion for a mistrial "since the question, as modified by the court in admonishing the jurors to 'ignore any reference in that question to malpractice insurance,' sought to
reveal implied bias beyond a juror's mere interest in a named
indemnitor, previously asked by the court."' 14 3 This statement
implies that the trial court had asked the "insurance question"
135. Id. at 288, 95 N.W.2d at 16 (citations omitted).

136. Id. at 289, 95 N.W.2d at 16.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

296 Minn. 93, 206 N.W.2d 652 (1973).
Id. at 95, 206 N.W.2d at 654.
Id. at 95-96, 206 N.W.2d at 654.
Id. at 96, 206 N.W.2d at 654.
304 Minn. 378, 231 N.W.2d 285 (1975).

142. Id. at 380, 231 N.W.2d at 287.
143. Id. at 381, 231 N.W.2d at 287.
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of the jurors before plaintiff's counsel asked the question
about employment as claims adjusters. The supreme court did
not address in any detail either the basis for Rule 31 or the
possibility that the jurors knew that the insurer named in the
"insurance question" was the liability insurer for the
defendant.
Recently, Rule 31 was cited by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in McCarthy v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc. 144 McCarthy Well

brought an action against St. Peter Creamery to recover the
balance due for work done on a well, and the creamery counterclaimed alleging negligent installation and removal of a
pump in the well. 145 Although the specifics of the inquiry are
not noted in the appellate opinion, the trial court apparently
asked the jurors whether or not they had any relationship with
McCarthy Well's insurer. 146 The court of appeals cited Rule
31 and HardwareMutual Insurance Co. 147 as permitting the trial

court to examine jurors about their contacts with an insurer
that is not a party to the action but is interested in the defense
or outcome of the action. 48 Citing Viou, the court noted:
"The propriety and necessity of examining jurors about their
potential affiliations with an insurer rests in the discretion of
49
the trial court."'
The pretrial conference in which the trial court obtained the
name of McCarthy Well's insurer and discussed the insurer's
interest in the action was not transcribed. 50 Because these
discussions were missing from the record and because the parties submitted conflicting affidavits on the pretrial conference
proceedings, the court of appeals was prevented from determining what facts the trial court possessed that led it to examine the jurors about McCathy Well's insurer.15' The court
of appeals concluded: "In an area committed to the discretion
of the trial court, this record is insufficient to find an abuse of
52
that discretion." 1

144. 389 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 516.
See id. at 517.
234 Minn. 391, 401-02, 48 N.W.2d 567, 573 (1951).
389 N.W.2d at 519.
Id.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 519-20.

152. Id. at 520.
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On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court also found that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in asking the jurors
the insurance question during voir dire. 53 The supreme court
cited Rule 31, noting that the Rule permitted the trial court to
collectively question the jurors about their relationship with
"an interested insurance company."' 54 The supreme court
also cited Viou in stating that "the proper scope of such an inquiry lies within the discretion of the trial court."' 5 5
Several other cases address the subject of an attorney's conduct which suggests or implies the existence of insurance.
Those cases, however, do not interpret Rule 31 or the common law precedents pertaining to discussions of insurance
56
during voir dire.'
C.

The "New JIG" Recommendation Regarding the Insurance
Question -JIG 7

The new Civil Jury Instruction Guides, published in 1986 by
the Civil JIG committee of the Minnesota District Judges Association, recommend that no instruction be given about insurance.' 5 7 In the authorities section that follows JIG 7, it is
noted that "[i]nquiry can properly be made during the voir
dire examination of the jury regarding interest in specified insurance companies."'' 58 This JIG comment also cites Rule 31
which requires that the inquiry regarding interest in specified
insurance companies must be made collectively to the jury, not
to each juror individually.' 5 9 Other mention of insurance coverage or interest in insurance is generally improper.16 0 The
153. McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn.
1987).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Purdes v. Merrill, 268 Minn. 129, 135-36, 128 N.W.2d 164, 168
(1964) (reversing trial court's denial of a new trial where plaintiff's attorney asked the
jury for $40,000 and said that an award of anything more would be "punishing personally" either the plaintiff or one of the two defendants); Ostrowski v. Mockridge,
242 Minn. 265, 269, 65 N.W.2d 185, 188 (1954) (affirming trial court's decision to
strike but not find prejudice in plaintiff's repeated testimony which referred to the
defendant's insurance coverage); Clark v. Johnson Bros. Constr., 370 N.W.2d 896,
899-900 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (relating to defense counsel's reference to plaintiff's
health insurance coverage).
157. 4 MINN. PRAC. Civ. JIG 7 (West 3d ed. 1986).
158. Id.

159. Id.
160. Id.
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comment concludes that if insurance is not mentioned pursuant to Rule 31, "no general cautionary instruction should be
given to the jury. Such instruction unduly emphasizes a matter
that is of no concern in the case and which has not theretofore
'
been improperly injected into the proceedings."'

IV.

61

THE COMMON LAW DILEMMA REMAINS UNADDRESSED

In cases preceding Rule 31, the supreme court acknowledged that "in determining who is entitled to a verdict the issues should be treated exactly as if there was no insurance, nor
should the recovery, if any, be lessened or increased one penny
because of insurance."' 62 The court in Gracz condemned the
practice of questioning a defendant during trial about liability
insurance because the questioning "would have tended only to
prejudice the minds of the jury in favor of plaintiff's recovery." 63 Yet in case law preceding Rule 31, the supreme court
firmly established that a plaintiff has the right to ask the "insurance question" to determine if any jurors may be biased by a
64
relationship with defendant's insurer. 1

Modern practice fails to directly resolve this common law dilemma. The trial courts have "watered down," somewhat, the
plaintiff's right to determine bias by refusing to allow any inquiry beyond a mere determination of whether or not any prospective juror has an interest in the named insurer. However,
the alleged damage to defendant remains. As the supreme
court has acknowledged, when the jury hears that a named insurance company has an interest in the outcome, they assume
that the named company insures the defendant.

65

If jurors

are expected to be prejudiced in favor of the plaintiff's recovery because of discussions of the defendant's insurance during
trial, there is no reason to expect them to be any less
prejudiced when the discussions occur during voir dire.
161. Id.
162. Storhaugen, 171 Minn. at 52, 213 N.W. at 374.
163. Gracz, 104 Minn. at 479, 116 N.W. at 1118.
164. Antletz, 97 Minn. at 220, 106 N.W. at 518; see also Spoonick, 89 Minn. at 359, 94
N.W.at 1081.
165. See, e.g., Lesewski, 254 Minn. at 288, 95 N.W.2d at 16; Martin, 183 Minn. at
264, 236 N.W. at 315; see also Storhaugen, 171 Minn. at 52, 213 N.W. at 374 (stating
that whenever jurors are asked about an insurance company, they assume that the
insurer has an outcome in the case).
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ANALYSIS OF THE REAL FUNCTION OF THE
"INSURANCE QUESTION"

All the appellate opinions assume that all prospective jurors
who have an interest in the defendant's insurer know that the
insurer provides coverage to the defendant. 166 One of the first
voir dire questions asked, however, is whether or not the juror
has any knowledge about the facts of the case. If the jurors are
not aware of the facts of the case, it is highly unlikely that any
of the jurors would know who defendant's insurer is. Without
that knowledge, jurors insured by the same carrier as defendant would not have a bias on that basis.
Jurors having a relationship with the company other than as
policyholders would have a much greater likelihood of knowing that the insurer has an interest in the outcome of the case
without having heard the "insurance question." This is particularly true of claims representatives, local agents or employees. The harm that defense counsel seek to avoid with such
prospective jurors is having them blurt out that they know
something about the case because they work for defendant's
insurer. In reality, though, the likelihood of a local agent or
employee of the defendant's insurer being on the venire panel
is very small. Even if it occurred, counsel would discover it
upon reviewing the jury list and could then move, in chambers,
to excuse any such juror.
Therefore, the real function of the "insurance question" is to
let the jury know that the defendant has insurance with which
to pay any verdict. The following examples further illustrate
this point.
In Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co.,167
counsel asked the jurors if any of them had an interest in a
named insurer even though the plaintiff did not have insurance. 168 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Hallam noted that
"[t]he apparent purpose of the line of questions asked was to
create in the minds of the jurors an impression that plaintiff
[who was defending a counterclaim] would be reimbursed by
166. The supreme court explicitly stated this in Lesewski, 254 Minn. at 288-89, 95
N.W.2d at 16; Martin, 183 Minn. at 264, 236 N.W. at 315. This knowledge is also
implied by the supreme court in several other opinions, see, e.g., Storhaugen, 171
Minn. at 52, 213 N.W. at 374.
167. 134 Minn. 378, 159 N.W. 832 (1916).
168. Id. at 379, 159 N.W. at 832.
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insurance for any damages it might be required to pay. I can
169
conceive of no other purpose."'

One Minnesota district courtjudge reflected that he believes
the question evolved when automobile insurance was not
mandatory, and the plaintiffs' counsel wanted to let the jury
know that, while not everyone had insurance with which to pay
0
a claim, this particular defendant did.17
Many years ago, a St. Cloud attorney was about to begin a
trial in Little Falls. He did not recall the name of his client's
insurer and did not have that information with him. So the
lawyers and the judge made up the name of the insurer. When
the "insurance question" was asked of the jury, a couple of
them raised their hands as having an interest in the named insurer, but they assured the court that their affiliation with the
insurer would not prejudice their view of the case.' 7 '
More recently, in a case where a plaintiff company sued its
insurance agent for failure to procure coverage, neither counsel nor the court mentioned the "insurance question," the jury
was impaneled without it and the court recessed for lunch.
Plaintiff's counsel returned from lunch, and commented to defendant's counsel 72 that his clients had asked over lunch how
the jury would know that the defendant's insurer, rather than
the defendant himself (whom they liked and assumed the jury
would like), would pay any verdict for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
counsel then remembered that the "insurance question" had
1 73
not been asked.

If they did not feel threatened by the possibility of elimination of the "insurance question," even plaintiffs' counsel
would probably admit that its real purpose is to let the jury
know that the defendant has insurance with which to pay the
verdict.
Whether or not jurors would fail to render an adequate verdict because of concern over the defendant's inability to pay is
a legitimate voir dire concern. In letting the jury know that the
defendant has insurance, plaintiff's counsel magnanimously
169. Id. at 381, 159 N.W. at 833.
170. Interview with Honorable Paul Hoffman, supra note 7.
171. Interview with Richard Quinlivan (September 1987) (regarding case tried by
Ray Quinlivan); interview with Honorable Paul Hoffman, supra note 7.
172. The author was the defendant's counsel in this case.
173. North Cent. Outdoor Equip. Co., Inc. v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Casualty Co.
and Citizens Agency, Inc., No. 41673 (Crow Wing County Dist. Ct. May, 1985).
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avoids this problem. However, if the court allows plaintiff's
counsel to inform the jury of the defendant's ability to pay, the
court should also allow defendant's counsel to notify the jury
of the plaintiff's ability to pay for its own damages. If it is appropriate to tell a jury that the defendant has insurance, then it
arguably is appropriate to tell them the coverage limits and the
expected effect of a plaintiff's verdict on the defendant's rates
or insurability. 174 Furthermore, if it is appropriate to tell the
jury about the defendant's insurance, it also seems appropriate
to tell them about the plaintiff's insurance, i.e., health insurance, workers' compensation, or, in a wrongful death case, life
insurance. Yet all of these inquiries deviate from a true tort
system.
Some plaintiffs' counsel view their clients as having a vested
right as third party beneficiaries in defendant's insurance.
They want the jury to know that their client's claim is really an
insurance claim, similar to a person seeking reimbursement
from a health insurance carrier. The problem with this contention, however, is that the two situations are dissimilar; the
health insurer's duty to pay arises without fault while the liability insurer's duty to pay does not.
VI.

SOME POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS OF THE
"INSURANCE QUESTION"

The following situations demonstrate the possible side effects of asking the insurance question.
A.

Two Insurers In a Two Party Case

Suppose a plaintiff and a defendant are individuals. The
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received
no-fault benefits. Is it appropriate for the court to name both
the defendant's liability insurer and the plaintiff's own no-fault
carrier? Presumably so, since the no-fault carrier would have
an interest in a jury's finding of no need for additional medical
treatment. In such a case, would the jury speculate that the
plaintiff had already been paid insurance benefits, and that the
plaintiff's insurer is now seeking reimbursement from the defendant's insurer? Probably not. It would seem more likely
174. Perhaps the insurer has given notice of a reservation of rights, in which case
there might not be any coverage.
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that the jury would believe that the defendant has two insurance policies, instead ofjust one (a lot of insurance with which
to pay any judgment).
B.

Multiple Parties

One district court judge recalls a case where the plaintiff was
the son-in-law of a Becker County farmer. The farmer was
putting in a basement under his house and the son-in-law was
helping. Not knowing that exposing skin to wet cement may
cause substantial burns, the son-in-law worked in the cement
on his knees. The cement soaked through the son-in-law's
pants, and he received severe burns to his legs and knees as a

result. 175
The son-in-law sued his father-in-law. The local supplier of
the cement and the cement manufacturer from Mason City,
1 76
Iowa were named as defendants or third-party defendants.
The father-in-law appeared at trial in his bib overalls. The
father-in-law did have significant insurance coverage. His insurance company did provide him with a defense in the case
and would have indemnified him for a fairly substantial judgment against him. The local ready mix company also had insurance, and its representative appeared at the trial in a
business suit. Three gentlemen in business suits appeared at
trial on behalf of the Mason City cement company, which was
essentially self-insured. During voir dire, the trial judge questioned the jury about two insurance companies - the insurer
for the farmer and the insurer for the local cement

company. 177
The case ended in a mistrial. Later, the trial judge talked
with several of the jurors about the case. The jurors indicated
that their sympathies were with the poor "uninsured" farmer
1 78
in his bib overalls.
C.

"The Insurance Crisis"

Since the advent of the media's reference to an "insurance
crisis," plaintiff's counsel have sought the right to ask prospective jurors if reports of an "insurance crisis" or calls for "tort
175. Interview with Honorable Paul Hoffman, supra note 7.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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reform" in the media have caused them to feel that plaintiffs
should not bring lawsuits or should not "fully recover" if they
do. The exact effect of such discussions is unknown. On the
one hand, plaintiff's counsel receives assurance that the jury
will "fully compensate" the plaintiff without regard to any "insurance crisis." On the other hand, such comments may cause
jurors to remember negative effects of the "insurance crisis"
such as the cancellation of recreational activities for children
because of the cost of insurance. There are members of the
defense bar who believe that such voir dire discussions, as well
as the "insurance question," actually help defendants because
they remind jurors that all of us pay for jury verdicts through
insurance premiums. If these beliefs are correct, it would be
plaintiffs, rather than defendants, who would benefit from
elimination of the "insurance question" during voir dire.
CONCLUSION

The only recent appellate court examinations of the insurance question during voir dire are in the McCarthy Well opinions. As in the past, the courts have failed to address the
contradiction that remains in the common law. This contradiction needs to be addressed and resolved.
The author of this article must acknowledge his inherent
bias toward defendants, who he typically represents. Nevertheless, having thoroughly studied the case law and Rule 31,
the author suggests that fundamental fairness dictates that the
"insurance question" ought to be eliminated. In nearly every
case, the legitimate function of the question can be met by simply asking the jury if any of them have heard anything about
the case. Those who have learned about the case through a
relationship with defendant's insurer will respond. The remaining jurors, then, will not be prejudiced by any discussion
of the defendant's insurance.
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